Abstract
This paper discusses Lee's argument that Lewis's reformed conditional analysis of dispositions is preferable to the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Lee's argument is basically that there are some examples that can be adequately handled by Lewis's analysis but cannot by the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. But I will reveal that, when carefully understood, they spell no trouble for the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, failing to serve a motivating role for Lewis's analysis.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 579-588 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Philosophia (United States) |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Acknowledgement This work was done under Global Research Network Program (collaborators: Huw Price, Alexander Bird, and Toby Handfield), which was supported by the Korea Research Foundation Grant funded by the Korean Government (MEST) (KRF-2008-220-A00001).
Keywords
- Causation
- Conditional analysis
- Counterfactual conditionals
- David Lewis
- Dispositions
- Jeaho Lee
- Sungho Choi