Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy

Sung Hoon Park; Jeong Yoo Kim

doi:10.1007/s00355-021-01361-8

Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy

Sung Hoon Park, Jeong Yoo Kim

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines evolutionary stability of preferences in games with strategic complements or substitutes following the indirect evolutionary approach. Preferences are classified into three types: altruism, selfishness, and envy. Depending on the nature of a game (one with strategic substitutes or complements), envy or altruism respectively is strictly dominated. Based on this, we show that an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) exists in which selfishness and envy survive together in games with strategic substitutes, whereas no ESS exists in which altruism and selfishness coexist in games with strategic complements.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	349-363
Number of pages	15
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	58
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01361-8
Publication status	Published - Feb 2022

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© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.

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abstract = "This paper examines evolutionary stability of preferences in games with strategic complements or substitutes following the indirect evolutionary approach. Preferences are classified into three types: altruism, selfishness, and envy. Depending on the nature of a game (one with strategic substitutes or complements), envy or altruism respectively is strictly dominated. Based on this, we show that an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) exists in which selfishness and envy survive together in games with strategic substitutes, whereas no ESS exists in which altruism and selfishness coexist in games with strategic complements.",

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Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy

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