Abstract
External hardware-based kernel integrity monitors have been proposed to mitigate kernel-level malwares. However, the existing external approaches have been limited to monitoring the static regions of kernel while the latest rootkits manipulate the dynamic kernel objects. To address the issue, we present KI-Mon, a hardware-based platform that introduces event-triggered monitoring techniques for kernel dynamic objects. KI-Mon advances the bus traffic snooping technique to not only detect memory write traffic on the host bus but also filter out all but meaningful traffic to generate events. We show how kernel invariant verification software can be developed around these events, and also provide a set of APIs for additional invariant verification development. We also report our findings and considerations on the unique challenges for external monitors-such as cache coherency, dynamic object tracing. We introduce host-side kernel changes that alleviate these issues that involve changes in kernel's object allocation and cache policy control. We have built a prototype of KI-Mon on the ARM architecture to demonstrate the efficacy of KI-Mon's event-triggered mechanism in terms of performance overhead for the monitored host system and the processor usage of the KI-Mon processor.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 7874084 |
| Pages (from-to) | 287-300 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2019 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2004-2012 IEEE.
Keywords
- Kernel security
- hardware-based kernel monitoring
- kernel integrity monitors
- rootkit detection
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