Abstract
In dynamic spectrum access (DSA) control, the prevalent approach to provide economics incentives for operators is pricing, whereas load balancing gives congestion-avoidance incentives to secondary users (SUs). Despite complexities of i) the couplings between pricing, load balancing and SUs' spectrum access decision, and ii) the heterogeneity of primary users' traffic and SUs types, we propose to solve the joint load balancing and pricing problem to maximize operator' revenue in a monopoly market. In this market, we first show there exists a unique SUs' equilibrium arrival rate to the monopolist's channels, and then we show that the joint problem can be solved efficiently by exploiting its convex structure. We next propose a low-complexity algorithm that enable the operator to maximize its revenue.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 7036945 |
Pages (from-to) | 1035-1040 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Proceedings - IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2014 |
Event | 2014 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2014 - Austin, United States Duration: 8 Dec 2014 → 12 Dec 2014 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2014 IEEE.
Keywords
- Cognitive radio
- Dynamic spectrum access
- Load balancing
- Nash equilibrium
- Pricing