TY - GEN
T1 - Marketing games in social commerce
AU - Kim, Dohoon
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2013 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - This study first provides a stylized model that captures the essential features of the SC(Social Commerce) business. The model focuses on the relationship between key decision issues such as marketing inputs and revenue stream. As more SCs join the industry, they are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing and advertising expenditure. This type of competition may lead the industry away from its optimal development path, and at worst, toward a disruption of the entire industry. Such being the case, another goal of this study is to examine the possibility that the tragedy of commons may occur in the industry. Our basic analysis presents Nash equilibria with both homogeneous and heterogeneous players. Under a symmetric situation with homogeneous SCs, our analysis specifies the conditions that the tragedy of commons can occur. Further discussions provide strategic implications and policy directions to overcome the shortcomings intrinsic to the current business model, and help the industry to sustainably develop itself toward the next level.
AB - This study first provides a stylized model that captures the essential features of the SC(Social Commerce) business. The model focuses on the relationship between key decision issues such as marketing inputs and revenue stream. As more SCs join the industry, they are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing and advertising expenditure. This type of competition may lead the industry away from its optimal development path, and at worst, toward a disruption of the entire industry. Such being the case, another goal of this study is to examine the possibility that the tragedy of commons may occur in the industry. Our basic analysis presents Nash equilibria with both homogeneous and heterogeneous players. Under a symmetric situation with homogeneous SCs, our analysis specifies the conditions that the tragedy of commons can occur. Further discussions provide strategic implications and policy directions to overcome the shortcomings intrinsic to the current business model, and help the industry to sustainably develop itself toward the next level.
KW - Game model
KW - Marketing competition
KW - Regulation
KW - SNS
KW - Social commerce
KW - Tragedy of commons
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84873977440&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_10
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_10
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84873977440
SN - 9783642355813
T3 - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
SP - 125
EP - 137
BT - Game Theory for Networks - Third International ICST Conference, GameNets 2012, Revised Selected Papers
T2 - 3rd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2012
Y2 - 24 May 2012 through 26 May 2012
ER -