Abstract
In this paper I will discuss Richard Holton's defence of dispositionalism that all properties are essentially dispositional. By way of countering the objection that dispositionalism generates an infinite regress, Holton attempts to advance a con- sistent model of possible worlds where all truths are dispositional truths. But I will argue that the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, on which Holton's model is built, is so mistaken that Holton's model fails to serve his goal. What is more, it is not likely that we can successfully materialize the driving idea of Holton's model on an appropriately revised version of the conditional analysis of dispositions. Finally, I will discuss the lesson about the methodology of philosophy that we can learn from Holton's failure.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Worldviews, Science and Us Studies of Analytical Metaphysics |
| Subtitle of host publication | A Selection of Topics from a Methodological Perspective: Ghent, Belgium, 2 - 3 June 2005 |
| Publisher | World Scientific Publishing Co. |
| Pages | 44-63 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9789814299053 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9814295817, 9789814295819 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2009 |
Bibliographical note
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