Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants

Jeong Yoo Kim

doi:10.1007/s00712-008-0047-6

Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants

Jeong Yoo Kim

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I consider a model of plea bargaining with multiple codefendants. I mainly compare the equilibrium outcomes under joint negotiations whereby both defendants can observe both plea offers and under separate (secret) negotiations whereby they can observe only their own respective offer. Contrary to the widespread perceptions, the prosecutor is made worse off under secret negotiations or at best as well off as under joint negotiations. I also discuss the implication of equilibrium offers on fairness.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	263-276
Number of pages	14
Journal	Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
Volume	96
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0047-6
Publication status	Published - Apr 2009

Keywords

Fairness
Multiple defendants
Plea bargaining
Secrecy

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10.1007/s00712-008-0047-6

Cite this

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Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants

Abstract

Keywords

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