Social optimization strategy in unobserved queueing systems in cognitive radio networks

Cuong T. Do; Nguyen H. Tran; Mui Van Nguyen; Choong Seon Hong; Sungwon Lee

doi:10.1109/LCOMM.2012.111412.120830

Social optimization strategy in unobserved queueing systems in cognitive radio networks

Cuong T. Do, Nguyen H. Tran, Mui Van Nguyen, Choong Seon Hong, Sungwon Lee

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

62 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study a noncooperative game problem for queueing control in the Cognitive Radio (CR) system where selfish Secondary User's (SU) data packets (a.k.a. "customers" in this work) are served by a CR base station (a.k.a. "server"). The scenario is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing game with server breakdowns where each customer wants to optimize their benefit in a selfish distributed manner. We first show that the game has an inefficient unique Nash Equilibrium (NE). In order to improve the outcome efficiency, we propose an appropriate admission fee that can be easily implemented at the server. We then show that the social welfare at the equilibrium point can be coincided the social welfare of the socially optimal strategy.

Original language	English
Article number	6355008
Pages (from-to)	1944-1947
Number of pages	4
Journal	IEEE Communications Letters
Volume	16
Issue number	12
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/LCOMM.2012.111412.120830
Publication status	Published - 2012

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Manuscript received April 16, 2012. The associate editor coordinating the review of this letter and approving it for publication was D. Popescu. This research was supported by the MKE, Korea, under the ITRC support program supervised by the NIPA (NIPA-2012-(H0301-12-2001)). C. T. Do, N. H. Tran, M. Van Nguyen, C. S. Hong (corresponding author), and S. Lee are with the Dept. of Computer Engineering, Kyung Hee University, Korea (e-mail: {dtcuong, nguyenth, nvmui, cshong, drsung-won}@khu.ac.kr). Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/LCOMM.2012.111412.120830

Keywords

Cognitive radio
M/M/1 queue
game theory

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10.1109/LCOMM.2012.111412.120830

Cite this

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title = "Social optimization strategy in unobserved queueing systems in cognitive radio networks",

abstract = "We study a noncooperative game problem for queueing control in the Cognitive Radio (CR) system where selfish Secondary User's (SU) data packets (a.k.a. {"}customers{"} in this work) are served by a CR base station (a.k.a. {"}server{"}). The scenario is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing game with server breakdowns where each customer wants to optimize their benefit in a selfish distributed manner. We first show that the game has an inefficient unique Nash Equilibrium (NE). In order to improve the outcome efficiency, we propose an appropriate admission fee that can be easily implemented at the server. We then show that the social welfare at the equilibrium point can be coincided the social welfare of the socially optimal strategy.",

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note = "Funding Information: Manuscript received April 16, 2012. The associate editor coordinating the review of this letter and approving it for publication was D. Popescu. This research was supported by the MKE, Korea, under the ITRC support program supervised by the NIPA (NIPA-2012-(H0301-12-2001)). C. T. Do, N. H. Tran, M. Van Nguyen, C. S. Hong (corresponding author), and S. Lee are with the Dept. of Computer Engineering, Kyung Hee University, Korea (e-mail: {dtcuong, nguyenth, nvmui, cshong, drsung-won}@khu.ac.kr). Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/LCOMM.2012.111412.120830",

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AU - Lee, Sungwon

N1 - Funding Information: Manuscript received April 16, 2012. The associate editor coordinating the review of this letter and approving it for publication was D. Popescu. This research was supported by the MKE, Korea, under the ITRC support program supervised by the NIPA (NIPA-2012-(H0301-12-2001)). C. T. Do, N. H. Tran, M. Van Nguyen, C. S. Hong (corresponding author), and S. Lee are with the Dept. of Computer Engineering, Kyung Hee University, Korea (e-mail: {dtcuong, nguyenth, nvmui, cshong, drsung-won}@khu.ac.kr). Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/LCOMM.2012.111412.120830

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N2 - We study a noncooperative game problem for queueing control in the Cognitive Radio (CR) system where selfish Secondary User's (SU) data packets (a.k.a. "customers" in this work) are served by a CR base station (a.k.a. "server"). The scenario is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing game with server breakdowns where each customer wants to optimize their benefit in a selfish distributed manner. We first show that the game has an inefficient unique Nash Equilibrium (NE). In order to improve the outcome efficiency, we propose an appropriate admission fee that can be easily implemented at the server. We then show that the social welfare at the equilibrium point can be coincided the social welfare of the socially optimal strategy.

AB - We study a noncooperative game problem for queueing control in the Cognitive Radio (CR) system where selfish Secondary User's (SU) data packets (a.k.a. "customers" in this work) are served by a CR base station (a.k.a. "server"). The scenario is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing game with server breakdowns where each customer wants to optimize their benefit in a selfish distributed manner. We first show that the game has an inefficient unique Nash Equilibrium (NE). In order to improve the outcome efficiency, we propose an appropriate admission fee that can be easily implemented at the server. We then show that the social welfare at the equilibrium point can be coincided the social welfare of the socially optimal strategy.

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ER -

Social optimization strategy in unobserved queueing systems in cognitive radio networks

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