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The evolution of tolerance

  • Jeong Yoo Kim
  • , Kyu Min Lee
  • , Carsten Krabbe Nielsen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We examine dynamics about the evolution of tolerance. Tolerance is respecting the culture (including thoughts and beliefs) of others and not asking them to accept one’s own culture. A conflict due to different cultures can be avoided only by a coordination between the players in a way that either party yields, but the sequential nature of the tolerance game gives the first mover an advantage of intolerance, hence, no emergence of tolerance in equilibrium. However, an evolutionary approach shows that tolerance may emerge in equilibrium. The evolutionary dynamics can also explain diverse tolerance levels across societies and what Popper called the paradox of tolerance, that tolerance decreases tolerance. Finally, numerical simulations show that high tolerance propensity does not necessarily increase welfare of the population.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)133-150
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
Volume21
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2026

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2025.

Keywords

  • Evolutionary game
  • Intolerance
  • Paradox of tolerance
  • Tolerance

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